Hello and welcome to the fourth post of Talking Points! On February 28th, President Trump and Vice President Vance berated President Zelensky of Ukraine, for requesting further military aid in Ukraine’s war with Russia. This follows a shift in United States policy towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which began in early 2022, under the Presidency of Joe Biden. Initially, under Biden, the United States supported Ukraine with financial and military assistance. However, as the war dragged on, the Republican-controlled Congress wavered in its support. This shift in US policy has culminated under President Trump, who has overseen a shift US policy towards Ukraine, with the United States voting against a United Nations resolution calling Russia the aggressor in the war. To understand the deal, and the shift in US policy, we must understand the history of contemporary Ukraine, the original invasion of Ukraine, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the US support toward Ukraine. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate why the United States should support Ukraine, without concern of receiving a financial reward for doing so.

Contemporary Ukraine can be dated to July 1991, when the former Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic declared its independence as Ukraine. This was a result of the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, otherwise known as the Soviet Union. The nascent country struggled economically and politically, with widespread corruption. Political discontent with the political and economic situation culminated in the Orange Revolution of 2004, a series of protests caused by the results of the 2004 Presidential Election. The election was between opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko and the incumbent Prime Minister, Viktor Yanukovych. The election was viewed as heavily flawed, with credible allegations that then President, Leonid Kuchma, already known to have ordered the killing of an anticorruption politician, had manipulated the results of the election in favor of Yanukovych. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ordered an electoral revote, of which Yushchenko was declared the winner.

Despite his loss, the political career of Yanukovych was not over. In fact he was the successor to Yushchenko. In order to understand the Presidency of Yanukovych, it should be noted that one of the most pressing issues for Ukraine has been its orientation between the West and Russia. Yanukovych’s government had negotiated an agreement with the European Union, representing a shift towards the West away from Russia. However, despite overwhelming support from the public and approval in the Ukrainian parliament, Yanukovych declined to sign the agreement in late 2013, in favor of the Eurasian Customs Union, a customs union with Russia as the key member. This refusal triggered the Euromadian protests against his governments. The protests lasted until February 2014, and ended with the Revolution of Dignity, when the Ukrainian Parliament removed Yanukovch, in favor of Petro Poroshenko. However, these events resulted in unrest in parts of Ukraine which contained more ethnic Russians and where Yanukovych was more popular, chiefly Crimea and the Donbas.

Seizing the opportunity, Russia annexed Crimea, otherwise known as the Crimean Peninsula. The Crimean Peninsula is particularly important for Russia, due to its separation of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. Russia by itself lacks any warm-water ports, limiting its naval capability, and as such, its ability to project power around the world. However, Russia does border the Sea of Azov, which in conjunction with control of Crimea, can ensure its access to the Black Sea. The Black Sea in turn, through the Bosporous Straits of Turkey, provides access to the Mediterranean Sea, and world’s oceans. Thus control of this one Peninsula greatly improves Russia’a ability to project power around the world. Despite its importance to both Russia and Ukraine, at the time, Ukraine was not in a position to fight the Russian annexation of Crimea. This was also partly a result of the international community’s opposition to the annexation. Although some measures were taken against Russia, like removal from the G8, in general diplomacy was prioritized over military action.

Although there was little military resistance to the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine opposed Russian action in Donbas. Donbas is a region in Eastern Ukraine, along the Sea of Azov. Due to its position along the Sea of Azov, extensive natural resources, and heavy industrialization, the region is critical for both Russia and Ukraine, however, it is heavily populated by ethnic Russians. Following the Revolution of Dignity, some of these ethnic Russians declared independence, in the form of the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic. With support from Russia, the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republics engaged in a war with Ukraine. Although Russia refrained from publicly supporting these Separatists, it actively supported them through manpower, supplies, and special forces. This period of the conflict, known as the War in Donbas, lasted from 2014 to 2022, when it was subsumed into a direct war between Ukraine and Russia, with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia.

In late 2021, Russia began a large-scale build-up of military forces along its border with Ukraine. This was followed by the official recognition of the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic by Russia, and the subsequent commencement of the invasion. The invasion was announced by Putin as a Special Military Operation, in a speech by Putin where he used claims that Ukraine was committing genocide against ethnic Russians, that Ukraine was controlled by Neo-Nazis, that Ukraine was developing nuclear weapons, and that NATO was involved in developing military infrastructure, to justify the invasion. International outcry was swift, significantly more so than the the events of 2014, with the United States and the European Union taking swift action against Russia and in support of Ukraine. This, combined with the initial poor performance of Russian forces against Ukraine, indicated that Ukraine would be successful in the war.

On paper, Russian forces maintained superiority over Ukrainian forces. However, Ukrainian resistance was much more intense than expected. This, combined with logistical failures, technical and mechanical failures, poor coordination, and a failed operation to take Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, among other failures, resulted in high casualties among Russian forces, and slow advances. The greater than expected resistance of Ukraine against Russia, could be perhaps summed up by a quote of President Zelensky, who when offered evacuation by the United States, stated “The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride”. This quote was further demonstrated by Zelensky, who visited the United States and numerous European countries, seeking military aid. On these bases, considerable aid was supplied by the United States and Europe to Ukraine.

Numerous countries have contributed military aid to Ukraine, chiefly all NATO countries. The major suppliers include the United States, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, with the United States being by far the largest supplier. For example, as of early 2024, the United States had supplied 50% of all aid to Ukraine. This can be contrasted with the supported provided by Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, who together provided 27% of all aid to Ukraine at the same point. In addition, Poland, serves as a contributor of aid, and acts as the primary hub for aid to Ukraine. However, as the war has dragged on, the United States, by far the largest contributor has become more opposed to aid, with a major shift occurring under President Trump, who has come out against aid. Although the war has not included any major breakthroughs in favor of Ukraine, despite the aid, I would argue that the United States should continue to supply aid.

Although Russia is not as much of a pariah state as it was at the beginning of the war, the Russian economy is in decline, with meager growth in 2023 and 2024 due to defense spending on the war. This is particularly troubling for Russia, as it needs to pay troops well, due to the danger of being a soldier in Ukraine. These manpower problems can be demonstrated by the fact that North Korea has sent thousands of troops to fight alongside Russian troops in Ukraine, highlighting Russia’s manpower problems. Furthermore, the Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary group which fights on behalf of the Russian government, including in Ukraine, rebelled in 2023 against the Russian government, demonstrating the lack of morale among Russian troops. Finally, in December 2024, the government of Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad, rapidly and unexpectedly collapsed, demonstrating that Russia’s ability to exert its influence globally, is in decline, as Russia had been the primary backer of Assad’s Regime during the Syrian Civil War, which lasted over a decade.

I would argue that all these signs point to a Russia which will not be able to afford its war against Ukraine, that will not be able to command the numbers and loyalty, of the troops it needs, and that its international power has fallen as a result of the war. In other words, I do not see a path to victory for Russia. Despite the long war, support for continuing it remains high in Ukraine, which reduces the likelihood of its ending by a diplomatic solution. Furthermore, any diplomatic solution acceptable to Russia would require promises that Ukraine would not join NATO, the exact membership Ukraine would need as a security guarantee. Thus, I do not see the viability of a diplomatic solution, which means the war must end by other ends. By supplying military and economic aid to Ukraine, the United States can ensure that Ukraine has the equipment, funding, and training to outlast Russia, at no risk to American troops.